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Abstract—The N -1-1 contingency criterion considers the con-
secutive loss of two components in a power system, with inter-
vening time for system adjustments. In this paper, we consider
the problem of optimizing generation unit commitment (UC)
while ensuring N -1-1 security. Due to the coupling of time peri-
ods associated with consecutive component losses, the resulting
problem is a very large-scale mixed-integer linear optimization
model. For efficient solution, we introduce a novel branch-and-
cut algorithm using a temporally decomposed bilevel separation
oracle. The model and algorithm are assessed using multiple
IEEE test systems, and a comprehensive analysis is performed
to compare system performances across different contingency
criteria. Computational results demonstrate the value of consid-
ering intervening time for system adjustments in terms of total
cost and system robustness.
Index Terms—Unit commitment; contingency constraints; non-
simultaneous failures; branch-and-cut algorithms; Benders de-
composition.
NOMENCLATURE
Index Sets and Indices
• N : the set of buses, indexed by i, j
• G: the set of generators, indexed by g, G = |G|
– Gi: the set of generators located at bus i
• E : the set of transmission lines, E = |E|
– E.i: the set of lines oriented into bus i
– Ei.: the set of lines oriented out of bus i
– (i, j): the head bus i and tail bus j of line e
• C: the set of all N -1-1 contingencies, C = |C|
– c : contingency index, c ∈ {1, . . . , C}
– c : a binary vector that prescribes a contingency
• T : the set of time periods, indexed by t, T = |T |
Parameters
• Be: susceptance of line e
• f : vector of line capacity
• dti: demand at bus i in period t
• dt: demand vector in period t
• p
g
, pg: capacity lower/upper bounds for generator g
• rg(x) : vector of ramp-down rates given unit commitment
vector x
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• rg(x) : vector of ramp-up rates given unit commitment
vector x
• cs(x) : start-up and shut-down cost given unit commit-
ment vector x
• cp(p) : production cost given generation level vector p
• oe: allowable line overload factor during secondary con-
tingency periods, ≥ 1
• ε: load shedding threshold, ε ∈ [0, 1]
Decision Variables
• x ∈ {0, 1}G×T : unit commitment vector
• xg ∈ {0, 1}T : generator g unit commitment vector
• pt,f t,θt: vectors of generation levels, power flows, and
phase angles, respectively, in time period t under the no-
contingency (base) scenario
• ptg, f
t
e, θ
t
i : the generation level of unit g, the power flow
on transmission line e, and the phase angle on busi,
respectively, in time period t under the no-contingency
(base) scenario
• pct,f ct,θct, qct: vectors of generation levels, power
flows, phase angles, and loss-of-load, respectively, in time
period t under the no-contingency (base) scenario
• pctg , f
ct
e , θ
ct
i , q
ct
i : the generation level of unit g, the power
flow on transmission line e, the phase angle on bus i,
and the loss-of-load at bus i, respectively, in time period
t under contingency scenario c
I. INTRODUCTION
THE North American Electric Reliability Corporation(NERC) develops and enforces standards to ensure the
reliability of power systems in North America. The NERC
Transmission Planning Standard [1] defines system perfor-
mance requirements under both normal and various contin-
gency conditions. Among contingency conditions, the loss of
a single system component (N -1) and the near simultaneous
loss of multiple system components (N -k) are well studied.
However, a contingency criterion considering non-
simultaneous failures of two components has not attracted
much attention until recently (see [3], [8]). This contingency
criterion, referred to as N -1-1, refers to the consecutive
loss of two components with an intervening time period for
operator adjustments. In [3], the authors performed an N -1-1
contingency analysis of the Midwest ISO’s balancing area.
More recently [8] used interdiction methods to study N -1-1
contingency constrained optimal power flows with fixed unit
commitment decisions.
Following [8], we assume that an N -1-1 contingency sce-
nario involves the loss of a generating unit or a transmission
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2line, followed by system adjustments (e.g., generator re-
dispatch). Following these adjustments, the system experiences
a subsequent loss of an additional generator or line. Thus, there
are three distinct time periods in a given N -1-1 contingency
occurrence. The Base Case refers to the time periods in which
“the power system is in normal steady-state operation, with
all components in service that are expected to be in service”.
The first loss of a component is referred to as the Primary
Contingency/Loss, while the second loss is referred to as the
Secondary Contingency/Loss.
In this paper, we study the unit commitment (UC) prob-
lem under N -1-1 contingency constraints. Unit commitment
involves determination of a minimal-cost “on-off” schedule of
generating units and their respective dispatch levels, subject
to physical and operational constraints, in order to satisfy
forecasted demand in each time period of the subsequent day.
The basic UC problem, discounting contingencies, is well-
studied; relevant efforts were reviewed by [12] and more
recently by [13], [26].
The UC problem with contingency constraints has received
increasing attention from academics and practitioners since the
2003 northeast blackout in North America. More specifically,
N -1 and N -k contingency-constrained UC and related grid
design problems have been studied by [11], [14] and [16], [17],
[4], [5], respectively. References [11], [14] consider N − 1
contingency constrained UC, and employ line switching to
alleviate congestion and yield a more economical dispatch of
generation resources. References [16], [17] use robust opti-
mization to find an optimal dispatch schedule under the worst-
case N -k contingency scenario. Finally, [4], [5] introduce a
new N -k-ε criterion which dictates that at least (1 − εj)
fraction of the total system demand must be met following the
failures of j system components (for j ∈ {, . . . , k}); several
decomposition methods were proposed to solve the resulting
large-scale optimization model.
In contrast to the above work, we consider N -1-1 contingen-
cies, as defined in [1]. During the base (no-contingency) case,
and during time periods after the primary loss, all thermal
limits must be within applicable ratings and loss-of-load is
not permitted as a recourse action. During time periods after
the secondary loss, controlled load shedding and overloads
of transmission lines are allowed for emergency control per
NERC standards [1]. To solve the UC problem with N -1-1
contingency constraints, we introduce a novel decomposition
method combining branch-and-cut and a temporal decompo-
sition based on a separation oracle.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we briefly introduce the baseline UC problem
and study the impact of imposing N -1-1 contingency con-
straints. We then formulate the N -1-1 contingency-constrained
UC problem as a large-scale mixed-integer linear program
(MILP). In Section III, we describe our novel solution strategy.
Numerical experiments on several IEEE test systems are
considered in Section IV, where we perform a detailed analysis
comparing the impacts of the different contingency criteria
on UC solutions. Finally, we conclude in Section V with a
summary of our results.
II. UNIT COMMITMENT MODELS
We begin by introducing the baseline unit commitment
(BUC) problem. The objective of the BUC problem is to
determine a minimal-cost on/off schedule and corresponding
dispatch levels for a set of thermal generating units under
the no-contingency scenario. Building on the BUC problem,
we then introduce constraints to support N -1-1 contingency
compliance. We refer to the extended problem as the N -1-1
CCUC problem, or for conciseness simply N -1-1.
A. The Baseline Unit Commitment Problem
The BUC problem described below is based on the de-
terministic UC formulations introduced in [20] and [21]. We
extend these formulations to include a DC approximation of
power flow on the transmission network. The BUC problem
is formulated as follows:
min
x,f,p,θ
cs(x) + cp(p) (1a)
s.t. x ∈ X (1b)
Hpt +Af t = dt, ∀t (1c)
Be(θ
t
i − θtj)− f te = 0, ∀e = (i, j), t (1d)
|f t| ≤ f , ∀t (1e)
p
g
xtg ≤ ptg ≤ pgxtg, ∀g, t (1f)
rg(xg) ≤ ptg − pt−1g ≤ rg(xg), ∀g, t (1g)
The objective (1a) is to minimize the sum of startup
and shutdown cost cs(x) and generation cost cp(p). With
dispatch levels prescribed by p, cp(p) is often approximated
by a convex quadratic function for thermal generation units.
Constraints (1b) enforce generator minimum uptime/downtime
requirements and prescribe startup and shutdown cost as a
function of the units committed. The full description of these
constraints is provided in Appendix A. Constraints (1c)-(1g)
implement economic dispatch under a DC power flow model.
They include (in order): power balance at each bus; power
flow on a line; capacity limits for transmission lines; generator
dispatch lower and upper bounds; and generator ramping limits
across two consecutive time periods. By employing piecewise
linearization of the quadratic cost function, the BUC problem
(1) can be reformulated as a MILP.
Remark 1. We do not explicitly impose reserve margins in
the BUC as N -1-1 compliancy is a stronger reliability require-
ment; not only does it ensure sufficient generation reserves
for all contingency scenarios but additionally considers the
placement of these reserves given constraints on transmission
availability and capacity (see also [11]).
B. N -1-1 Contingency Constrained Operations
1) Set of all N -1-1 contingencies: An N -1-1 contingency
refers to the loss of two system components in different time
periods. We assume losses are possible for any generating
unit(s) and/or transmission line(s). Considering all pairs of
time periods for primary and secondary losses, and the possi-
ble loss of any generating unit and / or transmission line, the
3set C of all N -1-1 contingency scenarios is defined as follows:
C =
{
c ∈ {0, 1}(G+E)×T (2a)∑
g∈G
ctg +
∑
e∈E
cte ≤ 1,∀t ∈ T (2b)∑
t∈T
ctg ≤ 1, ∀g ∈ G (2c)∑
t∈T
cte ≤ 1, ∀e ∈ E (2d)
∑
t∈T
∑
g∈G
ctg +
∑
t∈T
∑
e∈E
cte = 2.
}
(2e)
An N -1-1 contingency scenario c ∈ C specifies the following:
(i) two time periods, denoted by t1 and t2, respectively
representing the time periods of primary loss and secondary
losses and (ii) one failed component in each of the two periods,
denoted by ct1e = 1 or c
t1
g = 1 and c
t2
e = 1 or c
t2
g = 1.
Constraints (2b) dictate that at most one component can fail in
any given time period. Constraints (2c) and (2d) specify that
each component fails at most once. Constraint (2e) requires
that exactly two distinct components fail. Based on (2), there
are
(
T
2
)
= T (T−1)2 possible pairs of time periods for primary
and secondary losses, G + E possible primary losses, and
G + E − 1 possible secondary losses. Thus, the set C has
cardinality |C| = C = T (T−1)2 (|G| + |E|)(|G| + |E| − 1).
Clearly, even for moderately-sized power systems and small
numbers of time periods, solution of the N -1-1 will pose a
considerable computational challenge.
2) N -1-1 contingency requirements: As illustrated in Fig.
1, an N -1-1 contingency scenario is composed of three non-
overlapping periods, defined as follows:
T 
Base	  
	  
Primary contingency Secondary contingency 
t1 t2 
Fig. 1. Three non-overlapping periods of an N -1-1 contingency scenario.
• Base (t ∈ {1, . . . , t1 − 1}). The system operates un-
der normal conditions with no failed components. Non-
anticipativity is enforced during this state, i.e., the op-
erating state (e.g. generation outputs and power flows)
are fixed regardless of the specific impeding contingency
scenario.
• Primary contingency (t ∈ {t1, . . . , t2 − 1}). The system
operates under a single failed component. At time period
t1, the system observes the primary loss and transi-
tions from the nominal operating state (prescribed by
p, f, θ) to the contingency c operating state (prescribed
by pc,f c,θc). If the outaged component is a generator g,
pt1g = 0. For all other generators g
′ ∈ G \ g, pt1g′ is ramp-
constrained by the generator’s dispatch level in period
t1 − 1.
• Secondary contingency (t ∈ {t2, . . . , T}). The system
operates with two failed components. Per NERC reliabil-
ity standards, controlled load shedding and line overloads
are permissible. Therefore, the line overload factor oe and
allowable load shedding ε (as a fraction of total demand)
can be utilized to alleviate operational infeasibilities.
For conciseness, we introduce in the following ”in the
contingency” w indicators and both allowable loss-of-load h
and line overload o quantities:
t∑
t=1
ccte = w
ct
e , ∀e, t and
t∑
t=t
cctg = w
ct
g , ∀g, t (3)
hcti =
{
0, ∀i, t = 1, · · · , tc2 − 1
dti, ∀i, t = tc2, · · · , T
(4)
octe =
{
0, ∀e, t = 1, · · · , tc2 − 1
oe, ∀e, t = tc2, · · · , T
(5)
Constraints (4) and (5) require that during secondary contin-
gency periods, the allowable loss-of-load and overload factor
are equal to dti and oe, respectively. These values are zero in
all other periods.
Then, ∀c ∈ C, the contingency dispatch operation in periods
t ∈ {tc1, . . . , T} is constrained as follows:
Hpct +Af ct + qct = dt, ∀t (6a)
Be(θ
ct
i − θctj )(1− wcte )− f cte = 0, ∀e = (i, j), t (6b)
|f cte | ≤ fe(1− wcte )(1 + octe ), ∀e, t (6c)
p
g
xtg(1− wctg ) ≤ pctg ≤ pgxtg(1− wctg ), ∀g, t (6d)
rg(xg) ≤ pctg − pc,t−1g ≤ rg(xg), ∀g, t (6e)
qct ≤ hct, ∀t (6f)
1>qct ≤ ε1>hct, ∀t (6g)
p
ctc1−1
g − pt
c
1−1
g = 0, ∀g ∈ {g|ct
c
1
g = 0} (6h)
Contingency constraints include (in order of appearance):
power balance at each bus, with unsatisfied demand qct (6a);
power flows on each line (6b); line capacity bounds (6c)
with overload factor oe during secondary contingency periods;
generation dispatch bounds (6d); generator ramping limits
(6e); upper bound on loss-of-load at each bus (6f); threshold
for total loss-of-load in periods after secondary loss (6g);
and the non-anticipativity constraint for generators not in the
contingency in period tc1 (6h).
C. Full Formulation
The optimization objective in the N -1-1 model is to find
a minimum-cost UC and no-contingency scenario economic
dispatch such that a feasible recourse power flow exists under
each N -1-1 contingency scenario. The full formulation is
obtained by combining the BUC model (1) with the full set of
contingency constraints (6), one for each contingency scenario
4c ∈ C. The full formulation of the N -1-1 CCUC model is then
given as follows.
min
x,f,p,θ
fc,pc,qc,θc
cs(x) + cp(p) (7a)
s.t. Constraints (1b) – (1g) (7b)
Constraints (6a) – (6h), ∀c ∈ C (7c)
Model (7) is an extremely large-scale MILP due to the
full set of DCOPF constraints (7c), one for each contingency
scenario. The objective (7a) includes only the unit commit-
ment cost and the no-contingency scenario generation cost.
However, extension to consider worst-case cost is straightfor-
ward. Following established models ([11], [4], [5]), we ignore
costs during a contingency state, as the primary concern of
system operators during a contingency is to ensure operational
feasibility and system stability.
Remark 2. In the N -1-1 model, there are T (T−1)2 (G +
E)(G + E − 1) sets of constraints (7c), which collectively
ensure that a feasible recourse power flow exists in each con-
tingency scenario. When defining the full set of contingency
scenarios (2), we assumed that when a primary contingency
component fails, its failure persist for the remainder of the
planning horizon. We can relax this assumption through in-
troduction of a new integer parameter τ ≥ 1 that prescribes
the number of time periods until the primary contingency
component is returned to service. Under this assumption we
do not need to consider all time period pairs for the primary
and secondary contingency. Rather, it then suffices to consider
all pairs of time periods whose difference is τ . Then, there are
(T−1)+(T−2)+· · ·+(T−τ) = (2T−τ−1)τ2 pairs of primary
and secondary failure periods t1 and t2.
III. SOLUTION APPROACHES
The full MILP model (7) can be solved using an iterative
algorithm like Benders decomposition; direct solution via the
extensive form is not practical. In applying BD, we first
decompose the full problem into a master problem (MP),
defined by (7a)-(7b), and a set of subproblems (SP), defined by
(7c), one for each contingency c ∈ C. The MP prescribes the
unit commitment vector x and the no-contingency economic
dispatch (f, p, θ). The subproblems SP(x, p, c) are based on
Constraint (6), with the following augmentations:
• Add variables s to indicate the amount of load shedding
above the allowable threshold ε. This ensures relatively
complete recourse.
• Add the trivial objective function min 1>s.
The objective of SP is to minimize the amount of demand
shed above the allowable threshold. If the objective value
of SP(x, p, c), given by z, is zero then the current solution
x, p can survive contingency scenario c. Otherwise, a Benders
feasibility cut can be added to the MP to eliminate the
infeasible solution (x, p).
In state-of-the-art algorithms for contingency-constrained
UC problems, BD is typically implemented as a cutting plane
algorithm (CPA) ([4],[5],[21],[16],[18], and [19]). Although
easy to implement, CPA has limited computational tractability
because at each iteration of the algorithm an integer program
MP must be solved to select a candidate UC decision. We
next outline a branch-and-cut algorithm (BCA) that avoids
this drawback by only exploring the branch-and-bound tree
corresponding to the UC x once. BCA is a branch-and-bound
algorithm in which cutting planes are generated within the
branch-and-bound tree.
A. Branch-and-Cut Algorithm
Recent advances in optimization solver technology, both
in commercial (IBM CPLEX [7] and Gurobi [10]) and non-
commercial (SCIP [15] and DIPS [6]) packages, have sig-
nificantly simplified the implementation of branch-and-cut
algorithms by enabling the addition of violated inequalities
directly within the branch-and-bound tree, thus avoiding the
need to repeatedly explore the branch-and-bound tree defined
by the binary UC variables x. In IBM CPLEX, branch-and-
cut algorithms can be implemented using IloCplex.Callback
functions (e.g., IloCplex.LazyConstraintCallback). In recent
years, work on a number of combinatorial problems (e.g.,
survivable network design [9] and the minimum tool booth
[2]) have shown that a significant reduction, often an order
of magnitude or better, in computational time can be achieve
using a BCA compared to a CPA, with increasing reductions
in runtime for harder and larger combinatorial problems. This
motivates our development of a branch-and-cut algorithm for
N -1-1.
Let the linear programming relaxation of MP, the relaxed
master problem (RMP), be given as follows:
min
x,f,p,θ
cs(x) + cp(p) (8a)
s.t. x ∈ X (8b)
0 ≤ x ≤ 1. (8c)
Let L be the list of nodes of the B&B tree to explore.
Initially, L contains only the root node o with no branching
constraints. Before initializing the BCA, a number of valid
inequalities are added to the initial RMP to strengthen the
root node LP relaxation. We refer to these valid inequalities
as the cut pool P. We note that in BCA implementations it
is important to strengthen the root node adequately to avoid
unnecessary exploration of the B&B tree. Starting with an
empty P results in very slow pruning because many infeasible
nodes will only be pruned late in the search. However, adding
too many valid inequalities to P slows down the LP relax-
ation solves at each node. Thus, there is a significant trade-
off between strengthening the root node LP relaxation, and
thus avoiding unnecessary exploration of the B&B tree, and
overburdening the RMP, and thus increasing LP solve times.
This trade-off is more art than science and may be very specific
to the application domain. In our BCA implementation, we
initialize P with the following valid inequalities.
Let λ1 and λ2 be the capacity of the smallest and the second
smallest generators, respectively. Then the following are valid
5inequalities:∑
g∈G
xtg ≥ 3, ∀t = 2, · · · , T (9a)∑
g∈G
pgx
1
g − λ1 ≥ 1>d1 (9b)∑
g∈G
pgx
t
g − λ2 ≥ 1>dt, ∀t = 2, · · · , T (9c)
Constraints (9a) require that at least three generators be on at
any given time period after period one, since two generators
may fail in consecutive periods. Constraint (9b) dictates that
in period 1 the maximum capacity across all committed
generators minus the capacity of smallest generator in the
system must be greater than the total demand of period 1.
Constraints (9c) require the total capacity across of committed
generators minus the aggregate capacity of the two smallest
generators must be larger than the demand, for each period
after the first period. We have considered only a simple set of
valid inequalities for P and significant “tuning” is required to
determine the ”optimal” valid inequalities to initialize P .
Solving the RMP for a node o means solving the RMP
with associated branching constrained defined by o. Node o
prescribes the subset of discrete variables that are fixed at that
particular node of the B&B tree. In a depth-first variant of the
BCA, branching is performed until an integer solution is iden-
tified. Only when an integer solution is identified are violated
inequalities screened for each contingency scenario. At the
opposite extreme, violated inequalities for each contingency
scenario may be screened after each node solve, resulting in
the breath-first variant of the BCA. The former, depth first
variant, may result in a large node list L and the later may
result in the addition of a large number of violated inequalities.
A compromise between these two extremes may be achieved
by defining a branching depth parameter to control the trade-
off between branching and cut generation.
B. Temporally Decomposed Bilevel Separation Oracle
Typically, the existence of a feasible DCOPF for each
contingency scenario must be verified explicitly. Such ex-
plicit enumeration, however, cannot scale as the number of
contingencies C is extremely large, even for moderately-size
power systems and/or planning horizons. As we demonstrate in
our computational experiments, securing the system against a
small number of contingency scenarios is empirically sufficient
to ensure feasibility against the full set of contingency sce-
narios C. So, instead of explicitly checking feasibility across
all contingency scenarios, we describe a bilevel separation
problem to screen a small number of worst-case contingency
scenarios that in aggregate “covers” C.
As noted in [4] and [5], significant computational chal-
lenges exist in solving bilevel programs for power system
vulnerability analysis. In N -1-1 UC, these challenges are
further compounded by the fact that the vulnerability analysis
problem spans the T planning periods, resulting in a very
large-scale bilevel program with T ×G×E upper-level binary
decision variables. To overcome this computational challenge,
we perform a temporal decomposition in which component
failures are restricted to a preselected time period pair. We then
iterate over all possible time periods pairs, solving a simplified
and smaller bilevel separation oracle for each time period pair.
Given a unit commitment schedule x, a no-contingency
scenario power flow p˜, and a pair of periods t1 and t2 denoting
the times of the primary and the secondary contingency,
respectively, the Power System Inhibition Problem (PSIP) can
be used to determine the worst-case loss-of-load under any two
non-simultaneous component failures. In this bilevel program,
the upper-level decision vector c identifies the primary and
secondary component losses, and the lower-level decision
vectors (f, p, q, s, θ) correspond to recourse DCOPF under
the contingency scenario prescribed by c.
The set of valid contingency scenarios given a pair of time
periods (t1, t2) is given as follows:
C(t1, t2) =
{
c ∈ {0, 1}(G+E)×T : (10a)
∑
g∈G
ctg +
∑
e∈E
cte =
{
1, ∀t ∈ {t1, t2}
0, otherwise,
(10b)
ct1g + c
t2
g ≤ 1, ∀g ∈ G, (10c)
ct1e + c
t2
e ≤ 1, ∀e ∈ E
}
(10d)
Constraint (10b) dictates that a single component failure
occurs in each of time periods t1 and t2. Constraints (10c)
and (10d) require that each component can fail at most once.
In preceding formulations, c was an input parameter. How-
ever, in the PSIP c is decision vector prescribing the two failed
components. For notational convenience, we again define bi-
nary variables w to indicate whether or not a component failed
in the current period or a prior period. Then PSIP(x, p˜, t1, t2)
is given as follows:
max
w
c∈C(t1,t2)
min
f,p,q,s,θ
1>s (11a)
s.t. Hpt +Af t + qt = dt, ∀t (11b)
Be(θ
t
i − θtj)(1− wte)− f te = 0, ∀e, t (11c)
|f te| ≤ f
t
e(1− wte)(1− ote), ∀e, t (11d)
p
g
xtg(1− wtg) ≤ ptg ≤ ptgxtg(1− wtg), ∀g, t (11e)
rg(x) ≤ ptg − pt−1g ≤ rg(x), ∀g, t (11f)
1>qt − st ≤ ε1>dt, ∀t (11g)
pt1−1g − p˜t1−1g (1− wt1g ) = 0, ∀g (11h)
p, q, s ≥ 0 (11i)
The optimization objective (11a) is to maximize the mini-
mum amount of load shed above the allowable threshold given
by s. Constraint (11h) enforces non-anticipativity and ramp
constraints any generator not in the contingency at time pt1g
base on its no-contingency scenario output p˜t1−1g .
Model (11) is a bilevel program that cannot be solved
directly by commercial solvers, but it can be reformulated
as a mixed integer linear program (MILP) by dualizing the
lower-level linear program, combing the result with the upper
maximization problem, and linearizing the resulting bilinear
6terms in the objective. In the following algorithmic description,
the solution of PSIP refers to the solution of the linearized
MILP counterpart of (11).
Instead of solving C linear programs (6) at each iteration,
we can solve 12 (T )(T −1) mixed-integer linear programs (11)
for every time period pairs (t1, t2). We refer to this variant
algorithm as “Hybrid Branch-and-Cut” and present the full
algorithm as follows:
Algorithm 1: Hybrid Branch-and-Cut Algorithm (HBC)
Require: A starting cut pool P;
Initialization: z∗ = +∞, L = {o} ; /* o has no
branching constraints */
while L is nonempty do
Select a node oˆ ∈ L;
L← L \ {oˆ} ; /* delete node */
Solve RMP for node oˆ. Let (x, f, p, θ) be the
optimal solution and z be the optimal cost;
if z ≥ z∗ then
if x is fractional then
Branch, resulting in nodes o′ and o′′,
L← L ∪ {o′, o′′} ; /* add nodes */
else
foreach (t1, t2) pair do
Solve PSIP(x,p, t1, t2). Let ω be the
optimal objective value;
if ω > 0 then
add f − cut to P ;
L← L ∪ {oˆ} ; /* put back node */
else
if z < z∗ then
Define new upper bound z∗ ← z
and update incumbent x∗ ← x
end
end
end
end
end
end
return x∗
IV. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
We tested our models and the proposed HBC algorithms
on the IEEE 6-bus, 9-bus, 14-bus, 24-bus, 30-bus and 39-
bus systems 1 [23] on a laptop running Mac OSX, with
2.3 GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 8GB of memory. The
models and algorithms are implemented in C++ using IBM’s
Concert Technology Library 2.9 and CPLEX 12.6 MILP
solver. For each instance, we considered 12 time periods and
load-shedding threshold ε and line overload factor oe of 0.15.
The peak load factor for each system was estimated using the
Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) demand data
[25].
We begin with an analysis of optimal commitment and
dispatch decisions for the 6-bus system across the different
1All test cases can be obtained from http://pserc.cornell.edu/matpower
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Fig. 2. Single-line diagram of the modified IEEE 6-bus test system.
security criteria. The single-line diagram of the 6-bus system
is shown in Figure 2, in which green text denotes genera-
tor data, with minimum and maximum generation limits in
parentheses; blue text denotes maximum power flow in the
nominal operating state; and red text denotes loads. We added
three fast-ramping (and more costly) units G4 - G6 in close
proximity to load buses, to ensure system feasibility across
the four security criteria: N -0 (with the “1.5 rule” for reserve
margins2), N -1, N -1-1, and N -2.
The optimal commitment and dispatch decisions for the
6-bus system varies across different contingency criteria, as
shown in see Figure 3. For clarity of exposition, we summarize
the optimal commitment decisions for two representative time
periods (off-peak and on-peak) in Table I, in order to illustrate
the differences between UC decisions under different security
criteria. Under the “1.5 rule” (N -0), only slower-ramping and
lower-cost units G1 - G3 are committed in both time periods.
Under the N -1 criterion, unit G6 is committed in addition to
G1 - G3 during the peak period. Under the N -1-1 criterion, we
additionally commit G5 during the off-peak period and switch
from G6 to G5 during the peak period. The switch from G6
to G5 reflects a trade-off between production cost and start-up
cost. Unit G6 has a lower start-up cost but higher production
cost than G5. Consequently, when a generator may be needed
for a longer time (e.g., under N -1-1), G5 is preferable. Lastly,
when the security criterion includes consideration for two
(near) simultaneous failures (N -2) with no intervening time
for adjustments, the additional fast-ramping generator G6 is
committed. These results are consistent with our intuition that
fast-ramping units G4 - G6 are required only if G1 - G3
are not able to meet the security requirements. Additionally,
comparing different security criteria, N -2 requires more units
to be committed than N -1-1 due to the lack of adjustment
time between failures, and more units are committed for N -
1-1 than N -1 in order to cover the loss of a second unit in
subsequent periods after the primary loss.
Next, we compare total costs under different security criteria
and test systems, illustrated in Figure 4. As expected, we
observe that total cost increases monotonically from N -0 (“1.5
rule”), N -1, and N -1-1 to N -2. In all cases, the cost difference
under the N -2 and N -1-1 criteria demonstrate the value of
intervening time for system adjustments during a multiple-
failure contingency scenario. However, the magnitude of these
2The “1.5 rule” is defined as follows: A power system will carry reserves
equal to the dispatch level of the largest generator plus one half the dispatch
level of the second largest generator. This rule is adopted by several ISOs
(e.g., ISO-NE) in the United States
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Fig. 3. Optimal dispatch levels for different contingency criteria (6-bus)
TABLE I
UC DECISIONS UNDER DIFFERENT CONTINGENT CRITERIA FOR OFF-PEAK
AND ON-PEAK PERIODS (MODIFIED 6-BUS SYSTEM)
Off-peak (t = 3) On-Peak (t = 9)
G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6
N − 0 (“1.5 rule”) √ √ √ √ √ √
N − 1 √ √ √ √ √ √ √
N − 1− 1 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
N − 2 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
cost differences are system specific; some test systems (e.g.,
the 6-bus system) exhibit significant cost differences under
the N -1-1 and N -2 criteria but show little cost difference
between N -1 and N -1-1. In contrast, the 30-bus system shows
the opposite trend: little difference under the N -1-1 and N -2
criterion but significant differences between N -1 and N -1-1.
In the context of Remark 2, we assess the impact of varying
τ , the maximum time difference between the first and the
second component failures, for all six test systems. Notice that
τ = 0 under N -1-1 corresponds precisely to N -2. Results for
the 6-bus system are summarized in Figure 5. Qualitatively
similar results hold for the other test systems. The results
indicate that total cost is invariant to changes in τ greater
than zero. We observe that the computational tractability of
the N -1-1 problem is strongly dependent on the parameter
τ . As τ increases, the number of time period pairs (t1, t2)
grows exponentially. Our results suggest that solving N -1-1
instances with τ = 1, considering only intervening time of a
single period, may be a good proxy for the full N -1-1 problem.
However, rigorously mathematical proof and/or comprehensive
numerical experiments on a variety of test systems are required
to validate this numerical observation.
Finally, we discuss the efficacy of our HBC algorithm and
the implicit search for the worst-case contingency scenario
by solving PSIPs, rather than explicitly screening the full
set of contingency scenarios for each candidate UC solution.
We denote the size of the dynamic contingency list as M .
The size of the final dynamic contingency list M and the
cardinality of the contingency scenario set C are reported in
Table II. For each test system, the number of contingency
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TABLE II
PERCENTAGE OF CONTINGENCY SCENARIOS IDENTIFIED FOR THE N -1-1
CONTINGENCY CRITERION
Test systems G E M C Ratio
6-bus 6 11 5 330 1.52%
9-bus 6 9 8 330 2.42%
14-bus 10 20 3 990 0.30%
24-bus 32 38 3 10912 0.03%
30-bus 8 41 10 616 1.62%
39-bus 14 46 16 2002 0.80%
scenarios identified is only a very small fraction of the total
possible contingency scenarios, which implies that we only
need to generate feasibility cuts using a small set of “suf-
ficient” contingency scenarios to ensure N -1-1 compliancy.
This observation is consistent with the analogous observation
for general N -k cases, as reported in [4] and [5].
V. CONCLUSIONS
We focus on a UC model that considers non-simultaneous
component failures with intervening time for system adjust-
ments. The naive formulation of this model is an extremely
large-scale MILP, due to the coupling of consecutive time
period pairs. To overcome these computational challenges,
we introduce an efficient BCA algorithm using a temporally
decomposed separation oracle. The model and algorithm are
tested on multiple IEEE test systems, through which we
observe that (1) the often significant changes in commitment
and dispatch decisions for different security criteria; (2) the
cost benefit of system adjustment time; (3) the general N -
1-1 problem can be well approximated by only considering
consecutive failures (i.e., τ = 1); and (4) the number of
8contingency scenarios identified by our approach represents
a very small fraction of the total number.
Allowing for non-simultaneous failures in unit commit-
ment significantly increases the computation burden, relative
to other contingency criteria. Although our proposed CPA
framework is tractable for small and moderately size test
systems, significant computational challenges remain for larger
industrial systems and further algorithmic research in required
to achieve scalability. A stronger PSIP formulation or an effi-
cient heuristic will be required to cope with the computational
challenge posed by large-scale bilevel programs. Finally, a rig-
orous mathematic proof and/or a comprehensive computational
study is needed to support the idea of considering only one
single period between successive failures (i.e., τ = 1) as a
proxy for the fully general N − 1 − 1 problem. Aside from
computational challenges, from the theoretical point of view
the relationship (e.g., the relative magnitude of cost difference)
among different contingency criteria is also an interesting area
for further research.
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APPENDIX A
FULL DESCRIPTION OF CONSTRAINTS (1B)
The explicit description of Constraints (1b)3 is as follows,
which include (in order): initial online and offline requirements
for generators; minimum uptime in nominal time periods;
minimum uptime for the last Tug periods; minimum downtime
in nominal time periods; minimum downtime for the last
Tug periods; startup costs; shutdown costs; non-negativity for
startup/shutdown costs; and binary constraints for the on/off
status of generators.
∑Tu0g
t=1 (1− xtg) = 0, ∀g∑Td0g
t=1 x
t
g = 0, ∀g∑t+Tug −1
t′=t x
t′
g ≥ Tug (xtg − xt−1g ),
∀g, t = Tu0g + 1, · · · , T − Tug + 1∑T
t′=t(x
t′
g − (xtg − xt−1g )) ≥ 0,
∀g, t = T − Tug + 2, · · · , T∑t+Tdg−1
t′=t (1− xt
′
g ) ≥ T dg (xt−1g − xtg),
∀g, t = T d0g + 1, · · · , T − T dg + 1∑T
t′=t((1− xt
′
g )− (xt−1g − xtg)) ≥ 0,
∀g, t = T − T dg + 2, · · · , T
cutg ≥ Cug (xtg − xt−1g ), ∀g, t
cdtg ≥ Cdg (xt−1g − xtg), ∀g, t
cutg , c
dt
g ≥ 0, ∀g, t
xtg ∈ {0, 1}, ∀g, t
(12)
3Tu0g /T
d0
g denote initial minimal online/offline times; T
u
g /T
d
g denote
nominal minimum online/offline times; Cug /C
d
g denote startup/shutdown costs.
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